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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE-
AGRICULTURE: ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL CROP
SUBSIDIES LABELED NONADJUDICATIVE:
THE PENDING THREAT OF UNRESTRAINED
CONGRESSIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
DCP Farms v. Yeutter, 957 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1992)
I. FACTS
Plaintiffs-Appellees (DCP Farms)' are farming operations
which raise cotton, rice, and other crops on land situated primarily
in Tunica and Coahoma Counties, Mississippi. 2 DCP Farms had
created fifty-one irrevocable trusts in an attempt to maximize the
number of "persons" eligible to receive federal crop subsidies for
their farming operations.3  DCP Farms sued the Defendants-
Appellants, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)4
and the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service
(ASCS),5 a division of the USDA, alleging that the ASCS had
improperly determined that DCP Farms was ineligible to receive
federal crop subsidies.6 The purpose of this Comment is to study
the procedure that the ASCS utilized to deny DCP Farms' eligibil-
ity; therefore, the issue of whether DCP Farms actually violated a
1. Flowers Farms, Increase Plantation, Matagorda Plantation, Omega Plantation, and
Flowers & Parker Farms joined DCP Farms in the complaint. These farming operations
will be collectively represented as "DCP Farms."
2. DCP Farms v. Yeutter, 957 F.2d 1183, 1185 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 406
(1992).
3. Id. Through this creation of trusts, DCP Farms was slated to receive $1.4 million in
subsidies for the 1989 crop year. Id.
4. Clayton Yeutter, Secretary of Agriculture, was also named in the lawsuit. DCP
Farms, 957 F.2d at 1183.
5. For a comprehensive guide describing the ASCS administrative appeal process, see
Christopher R. Kelley & John S. Harbison, A Guide to the ASCS Administrative Appeal
Process and to the Judicial Review of ASCS Decisions, 36 S.D. L. REV. 14 (1991). The
authority of the ASCS is derived from the Secretary of Agriculture. Id. at 17-19. The
primary function of the ASCS is to administer the federal government's farm income
support programs through its three-tier system of county (COC), state (STC), and national
(DASCO) committees. Id. at 17-18. However, the ultimate responsibility for the farm
programs resides with the Secretary of Agriculture. Id. at 18. Most farmers only deal with
the ASCS through the COC level. Id. at 24. The COC determines whether a farmer is
eligible for federal benefits and may terminate a farmer's benefits if the farmer does not
comply with the program's provisions. Id. (construing 7 C.F.R. § 7.22 (1992)). The STC is
charged to hear all appeals of COC determinations. Id. at 26 (construing 7 C.F.R. § 7.20
(1992)). Finally, the DASCO office hears all final appeals. Id. at 27 (construing 7 C.F.R.
§ 780 (1992)). See infra text accompanying notes 65-69 (discussing congressional legislation
which proposes to change the current ASCS appeals process).
6. DCP Farms, 957 F.2d at 1185. The relative subsidy payments are derived from the
difference between a target crop price set by the government and the price that a farmer
would receive in the open market. See 7 U.S.C. § 1308 (1988).
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statutory provision is beyond the scope of this Comment.7
In April 1989, the Tunica County and Coahoma County ASCS
Committees (COCs) approved DCP Farms' creation of fifty-one
trusts as a basis for determining the amount of federal crop subsi-
dies that DCP Farms could receive pursuant to the relevant statu-
tory provision.' Shortly after this ASCS approval of eligibility at
the county level, the USDA's Office of Inspector General (OIG)
released a report about federal farm subsidy program abuses' and
used DCP Farms as an example of how numerous farming opera-
tions had attempted to violate the $50,000 per person limit."°
Following press accounts of the issues raised in the OIG
report, USDA officials and some congressional staff members met
to discuss the issues, particularly DCP Farms' alleged abuse."
Congressional staff members subsequently reported the abuses to
Congressman Jerry Huckaby. 12 The Secretary of Agriculture,
Clayton Yeutter, soon received a letter from Huckaby, wherein
Huckaby expressed his opinion about various reported abuses of
the federal crop subsidy program. 13 Huckaby's letter specifically
cited DCP Farms, and he urged the USDA to terminate DCP
Farms' eligibility for federal crop subsidies, stating that DCP
Farms' utilization of its trust creation was a scheme to evade the
relevant statutory provisions. 14 Secretary Yeutter's office routed
7. For more insight about a farming operation involved in this lawsuit and its alleged
statutory violation, one can order a transcript of the December 8, 1991 CBS program, "60
Minutes," which featured Flowers Farms in a segment entitled "Mississippi Christmas
Tree."
8. DCP Farms, 957 F.2d at 1186 (referring to 7 U.S.C. § 1308 (1988)). Pursuant to the
relevant statutory provision, each legal entity created by a farming enterprise may qualify
to receive a subsidy payment of up to $50,000. See 7 U.S.C. § 1308 (1988).
9. The OIG is an independent unit under the supervision of the Secretary of
Agriculture which conducts investigations and audits in order to prevent and detect fraud
and abuse in the administration of agency programs. 7 C.F.R. § 2610.1 (1992). It is
interesting to note, however, that a USDA representative testified at the trial that "OIG is
notorious for making findings that we [DASCO] don't always agree with." Brief for
Appellee at 7, DCP Farms v. Yeutter, 957 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1992) (No. 91-1384).
10. DCP Farms, 957 F.2d at 1186.
11. Id. Some of those present at the meeting were John Campbell, Deputy
Undersecretary of Agriculture for Commodity Programs; William E. Penn, Assistant
Deputy Administrator for ASCS State and County Operations (Penn worked in the DASCO
Office); and Parks Shackelford, the key staff aid on agricultural issues for Congressman Jerry
Huckaby, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Cotton, Rice, and Sugar. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. (referring to 7 U.S.C. § 1308 (1988)). The portion of Huckaby's letter
addressing DCP Farms' creation of irrevocable trusts states that the trusts
clearly [were] designed and carried out to evade the law applicable to payment
eligibility.... It seems clear that this reorganization was adopted as a device to
avoid the payment eligibility law, and I strongly urge you to enforce the
payment eligibility law. This provision of the law was adopted for this purpose.
Brief for Appellee at 8, DCP Farms v. Yeutter, 957 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1992) (No. 91-1384).
For a comprehensive overview of the history and implications of payment limitation rules,
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Huckaby's letter to William Penn, the ASCS administrator charged
with review of the final ASCS appeals in the Deputy Administrator
for ASCS State and County Operations (DASCO) office.'" Penn
drafted a response to Congressman Huckaby, assuring Huckaby
that the USDA would take an aggressive position with the DCP
Farms case.16
On June 1, 1990, Penn issued an opinion from the DASCO
office, concluding that DCP Farms had evaded the statutory provi-
sions'" of the federal crop subsidy program by treating its fifty-one
trusts as "persons," and therefore was ineligible to receive any sub-
sidy payments for the 1989, 1990, or 1991 crop years.'" Shocked
by DASCO's reversal of the initial eligibility determination made
by the COC level of the ASCS, DCP Farms appealed the determi-
nation and requested a hearing. A hearing was set for December
12, 1990.'1 DCP Farms then petitioned the DASCO office to pre-
vent Penn and the officials who were involved in the Capitol Hill
meetings from participating in any further administrative appel-
late proceedings.2 °
DASCO denied DCP Farms' petition to remove the allegedly
biased officials. 21 As a result, DCP Farms sued the USDA in fed-
eral court 22 for declaratory and injunctive relief.23 The trial court
granted a preliminary injunction to preserve DCP's eligibility for
federal crop subsidies. 24 The court held that the ASCS administra-
tive proceedings were impermissibly tainted by congressional
see Alan R. Malasky, ASCS Appeals and Payment Limitation Revisions in the 1990 Farm
Bill: What Did the American Farmer Really Gain (or Lose)? 68 N.D. L. REV. 365, 380-86
(1992).
15. Brief for Appellee at 9, DCP Farms v. Yeutter, 957 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1992) (No.
91-1384).
16. DCP Farms, 957 F.2d at 1186.
17. Id. See 7 U.S.C. § 1308 (1988).
18. DCP Farms, 957 F.2d at 1186.
19. Id.
20. Id. Without his recusal, Penn would be responsible for re-evaluating his own prior
decision, thereby presenting an impartiality problem. See Brief for Appellee at 12, DCP
Farms v. Yeutter, 957 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1992) (No. 91-1384). See infra text accompanying
notes 65-69 (discussing congressional legislation which proposes to change the current
appeals process). DCP Farms further requested that the June 1, 1990 DASCO decision be
declared invalid and that the COC decision be reinstated. DCP Farms v. Yeutter, 761 F.
Supp. 1269, 1272 (N.D. Miss. 1991), rev'd, 957 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1992).
21. DCP Farms, 957 F.2d at 1186.
22. For a discussion about judicial review of the ASCS and how the United States
government has opposed judicial review in the United States District Courts, see Alexander
J. Pires, Jr. & Shelley L. Bagoly, Federal Court jurisdiction Over USDA/ASCS Cases: How
and In What Courts Farmers Can Seek Review of USDA Denials of Their Farm Subsidy
Payments, 24 IND. L. REV. 1488, 1500-05 (1991).
23. DCP Farms, 957 F.2d at 1187.
24. DCP Farms v. Yeutter, 761 F. Supp. 1269, 1276 (N.D. Miss. 1991), rev'd, 957 F.2d
1183 (5th Cir. 1992).
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interference, and therefore concluded that the USDA had violated
DCP Farms' due process right to a fair and impartial adjudica-
tion.25 The court also concluded that the determination of DCP
Farms' eligibility was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
and contrary to law in violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act.26
On March 23, 1992, a panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed and
remanded the case with instructions to dismiss, concluding that
Congressman Huckaby's contact with the ASCS occurred "well
before any proceeding which could be considered judicial or
quasi-judicial. ' 27 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit held that the
congressional contact at issue was not in violation of DCP Farms'
due process rights.28
II. LEGAL HISTORY
The factual scenario in DCP Farms presents an example of the
interplay that exists between the legislative and executive
branches of the United States government when the respective
powers converge on a mutual issue. 29 Agencies under the execu-
tive branch occasionally assume a judicial role in addition to their
legislative decision-making functions; namely, agencies have the
power to 1) adjudicate and 2) make rules.30 An adjudication is a
determination of individual rights or duties, whereas rule-making
generally is an implementation of a law or policy which will have
an impact on the public-at-large. 31 This judicial role is imperative,
given the numerous disputes that may arise under the auspices of
25. Id. at 1276.
26. Id. at 1275-76 (construing the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988)).
27. DCP Farms, 957 F.2d at 1187. A collateral issue that was addressed to greater
extent in the Fifth Circuit's decision was whether the judicial review of the ASCS
administrative proceedings was justified under the futility exception to the administrative
exhaustion requirement. Id. at 1188-89 (construing the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 704 (1988)). See generally Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 903-04 (5th
Cir. 1981) (outlining various exceptions to the exhaustion of administrative remedies
requirement, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988)), rev'd, sub nom. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of
State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). The Fifth Circuit held that the district court abused its
discretion in determining that it had jurisdiction because DCP Farms had failed to provide
sufficient evidence to support a finding of futility. DCP Farms, 957 F.2d at 1189.
28. DCP Farms, 957 F.2d at 1185.
29. See id. at 1185-87.
30. 1 CHARLES H. KOCH & RONALD F. WRIGHT, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 2.3 (1985). See also Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 400
(1940) (holding that "judical power" may be conferred upon the National Bituminous Coal
Commission). Agencies that adjudicate disputes are classified as "article I courts." 1
CHARLES H. KOCH & RONALD F. WRIGHT, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.30,
(2) (Supp. 1992). Article I courts typically decide controversies between citizens and the
government. Id.
31. 1 CHARLES H. KOCH & RONALD F. WRIGHT, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 2.3 (1985).
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an administrative agency.32 Of course, judicial courts have the
limited power to review agencies' adjudications and to uphold
one's constitutional right to a fair and impartial administrative
adjudication.33
The seminal case of Pillsbury Co. v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion,34 established a legal standard protecting one's right to a fair
and impartial administrative adjudication. 35 The Fifth Circuit
panel in Pillsbury Co. recognized the need for an administrative
adjudication to be free from powerful external influences.36 In
Pillsbury Co., the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought an
antitrust action against Pillsbury for acquiring competing flour
millers, and thereby substantially reducing competition in the
southeast section of the United States.37 While Pillsbury was pre-
paring for its final administrative appeal of an FTC determination,
the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee
summoned FTC Chairman Edward F. Howrey and his staff to tes-
tify before the Subcommittee. 38 During his testimony, the Sub-
committee subjected Howrey to intense and repeated criticism for
his "wrong decision" not to apply the Clayton Act's "per se" doc-
trine to the Pillsbury case.39 The Subcommittee presumably dis-
approved of Howrey's decision because it opened the door for
Pillsbury to introduce countervailing evidence.4 ° The Fifth Cir-
cuit panel held that the congressional pressure on FTC administra-
tors to change their interpretation and application of the Clayton
Act during FTC's adjudication of Pillsbury's alleged antitrust viola-
tion, deprived the Pillsbury Company of its constitutional right to
a fair and impartial adjudication.4 1 The panel determined that
Congress' accusation that the agency had "made the wrong deci-
32. See infra text accompanying note 62 (identifying specific federal programs which
involve a determination of eligibility and subsequent adjudications if a dispute arises
between the applicant and the agency).
33. See Pillsbury Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 354 F.2d 952, 964 (5th Cir. 1966);
United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (stating that any questioning of a judge as
to his or her judicial processes would destroy judicial responsibility); In re Murchison, 349
U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (stating that a basic requirement of due process is a fair trial in a fair
tribunal). For an analysis of an Article III court's power to adjudicate direct constitutional
challenges to administrative adjudications, see MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 69-82 (1990).
34. 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966).
35. Pillsbury Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 354 F.2d 952, 964 (5th Cir. 1966).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 954.
38. Id. at 955.
39. Id. at 955-62. Howrey's failure to adopt the "per se" doctrine occurred during the
middle of the appeals process between Pillsbury and the FTC. Id. at 955.
40. Pillsbury Co., 354 F.2d at 955.
41. Id. at 964.
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sion" sacrificed the impartiality of the agency's pending adjudica-
tion, and thus, compromised the entire judicial process.42
Pillsbury Co. has since been regarded by courts as holding that
administrative adjudications are invalid if based, even in part, on
pressures emanating from Congress.4 3 Specifically, the panel in
Pillsbury Co. held that it is not necessary that congressional pres-
sure actually cause an administrator to consider extraneous factors;
instead, mere congressional bias is sufficient grounds for
invalidation. 4
The standard regarding judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings
enunciated in Pillsbury Co. differs from the standard promulgated
in United States v. Batson;45 wherein, the Fifth Circuit addressed
the limitations of congressional interference with nonjudicial 46
administrative determinations.47 The facts presented in Batson
involved an ASCS determination which required several farmers
to refund their over-payments of cotton subsidies because they
evaded the provisions of the Upland Cotton Price Support Pro-
gram.4" Although there was evidence of ASCS bias regarding
over-payments of subsidies (an ASCS hearing official was quoted as
saying "those people in Gaines County had bilked the government
out of six million dollars"), there was no allegation in Batson that
the "administrators had prejudged individual cases or were biased
against particular individuals."'49  In light of the fact that the
ASCS did not target specific individuals when it made its determi-
nation, the court recognized that the determination was not an
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. See Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 714 F.2d 163,
171 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that congressional interference had not tainted a debarment
proceeding because there was no evidence that the administrator was influenced or even
aware of the congressional pressure); Koniag, Inc. v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(holding that a congressman's letter compromised the administrator's impartiality), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978); D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1246 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (stating that if the administrator acted in a judicial capacity, his or her
determination could be invalidated if it was influenced in whole or in part by congressional
pressure), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972).
45. 782 F.2d 1307, 1315 (5th Cir. 1986) (court refusing to invalidate an ASCS
determination that the plaintiff had employed a device to evade payment limitations
because there was no evidence that the ASCS administrators' minds were irrevocably
closed or that they were biased throughout the entire decision-making process), cert.
denied, 477 U.S. 906 (1986).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31 (identifying the powers held by agencies
and explaining the difference between adjudication and rulemaking).
47. United States v. Batson, 782 F.2d 1307, 1313-15 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, Batson
v. United States, 477 U.S. 906 (1986). See also Dirt, Inc. v. Mobile County Comm'n, 739
F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating that the standards governing nonjudicial
proceedings are much more relaxed and much less likely to render the proceeding to be
violative of due process).
48. Batson, 782 F.2d at 1309.
49. Id. at 1313.
CASE COMMENT
adjudication, but rather, a legislative/nonjudicial proceeding.
Therefore, the court reasoned that such a determination by an
administrator may be invalidated only if there was evidence that
an administrator had irrevocably closed his or her mind prior to
making a determination. 50
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The Fifth Circuit in DCP Farms rejected the district court's
utilization of the Pillsbury Co. standard."1 Instead, the panel con-
cluded that an administrative proceeding determining eligibility
for federal crop subsidies was a nonjudicial procedure; therefore,
DCP Farms did not deserve the same rights afforded to parties
involved in an administrative adjudication." The Fifth Circuit
panel reasoned that no adjudication occurred because it viewed
Congressman Huckaby's influential. communication with the
DASCO office as part of a larger policy debate and not as a direct
attack upon the approval of DCP Farms' eligibility by the COC of
the ASCS.5 3 The panel also observed that ASCS eligibility pro-
ceedings at the county and national levels were just "preliminary"
proceedings which may be subjected to "the political tugs of the
different branches of government" without being violative of the
due process right to a fair and impartial adjudication. 4
DCP Farms marked a major departure from how other prece-
dents have labeled administrative proceedings as adjudicative, or
conversely, as nonjudicial.5 - The Fifth Circuit in DCP Farms con-
50. Id. at 1313-15. See also D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1247
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (enunciating a slightly different standard for invalidation of a nonjudicial
determination; namely, whether any extraneous factors intruded into the administrator's
decision-making), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972).
51. DCP Farms v. Yeutter, 957 F.2d 1183, 1187 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 406
(1992).
52. DCP Farms, 957 F.2d at 1188.
53. Id. at 1187. See supra text accompanying note 14 (referring to a letter from
Congressman Huckaby to Secretary Clayton Yeutter).
54. Id. at 1188.
55. The following cases identify and/or make reference to administrative
adjudications: Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1969) (court recognizing that an initial
decision to terminate an individual's welfare benefits were "summary adjudications");
Independent Bankers Ass'n of Ga. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d
1206, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (defining adjudication as a proceeding that determines
"adjudicative facts"); Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FrC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1161 n.17
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (concluding that an administrative action is adjudicatory if the decision
affects the rights or liabilities of a party), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980); Esch v. Yeutter,
876 F.2d 976, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (detailing the decision-making process for agricultural
subsidy programs from the county committee level up to DASCO, and holding that "there
were serious questions as to whether the adjudicative officials at any given point considered
all [the] relevant factors in reaching their determination"); United States v. Batson, 782
F.2d 1307, 1312-13 (5th Cir.) (1986) (referrring to the decision-maker at the county and
national levels as an "adjudicator"), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906 (1986); Weir v. United States,
1993]
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cluded that only a formal hearing may constitute an adjudica-
tion.56 However, the United States Supreme Court, in United
States v. Florida East Coast Railway,5 7 stated that a determination
of whether an administrative decision is adjudicatory depends
upon the substantive nature of the proceeding and how it impacts
particular parties. 58 The Supreme Court considered a three-part
test to determine whether an administrative proceeding was an
adjudication: 1) whether the action is generalized in nature; that
is, whether the action applies to specific individuals or to unnamed
and unspecified persons; 2) whether the promulgating agency con-
siders general facts or adjudicates a particular set of disputed facts;
and 3) whether the action determines policy issues or resolves a
specific dispute between particular parties.59
DCP Farms made no reference to Florida East Coast Railway.
Instead, the panel established a test of its own, focusing on the
formality of the appeals process, rather than on the nature and
circumstances surrounding a particular administrative determina-
tion. The panel appears to have disregarded the practical consid-
eration that influencing an adjudicator before, during, or after a
hearing has essentially the same effect. This decision demon-
strated a new philosophy by the Fifth Circuit-Congress should
have more control over federally administered programs. How-
ever, this new philosophy trivializes one's due process right to a
fair and impartial decision-maker.
IV. IMPACT
There are serious implications that arise from the Fifth Cir-
cuit's observation that due process rights do not "kick in" until the
commencement of a formal hearing. In light of the fact that
DASCO was scheduled to adjudicate DCP Farms' appeal on
December 12, 1990, the Fifth Circuit seems to have taken the
position that hearing officers, who ultimately will adjudicate a par-
ticular dispute, may in the meantime, "lend their ear" to influen-
310 F.2d 149, 156 (8th Cir. 1962) (referring to the county committee's initial determination
of the amount of farm benefits as an "adjudication"); United States v. Yarbrough, 290 F.
Supp. 4, 6 (N.D. Miss. 1968) (referring to the three-tiered ASCS appeal structure that
determines whether applicants are eligible for farm subsidies as an "intra-agency
adjudicatory process"); Swartz v. United States, 14 CI. Ct. 570, 572 (1988) (referring to
determinations by ASCS' three-tiered structure that administers farm subsidies in the form
of commodity price support loans as an "adjudication").
56. DCP Farms, 957 F.2d at 1187.
57. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
58. United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 244-46 (1973).
59. Id.
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tial outside sources, particularly, members of Congress.60
The departure taken in DCP Farms will challenge many judi-
cial precedents which have never considered DCP Farms' formal-
istic approach.6 ' It is still too early to conclude that DCP Farms
has initiated a trend, but the decision has laid a foundation for less
restraint on Congress whenever Congress may decide to use its
power to influence an administrative adjudication. DCP Farms has
created a void in which congressional pressure and influence can
be applied to coerce the outcome of many administrative deci-
sions, whereas those adversely affected would have no opportunity
to pursue a more just resolution. The result of the DCP Farms
decision may have the same effect on applicants of many other
federal benefit programs which employ administrative proceed-
ings similar to the ASCS proceeding in the instant case.62 The
applicants of these federal benefit programs could be severely
affected by the precedent established by DCP Farms, inasmuch as
they could be denied their right to fair and impartial adjudicative
administrative processes. The ramifications of DCP Farms con-
ceivably may jeopardize the integrity of the judicial function of
administrative agencies.6 3
North Dakota farmers have a good reason to be concerned
about the precedent established in DCP Farms as well. North
Dakota consistently has ranked near the top of the list of states
which receive the largest dollar amount of federal crop subsidy
payments provided by the ASCS.6 4 In light of the current deficit
reduction plans in this country, applicants requesting eligibility to
60. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15 (discussing DASCO's communication
with Congressman Huckaby prior to DCP Farms' December 12, 1990 hearing).
61. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing cases that identify
proceedings which are adjudicative).
62. The following is a partial list of federal benefit programs promulgated under the
relevant authority: 7 C.F.R. § 245.7 (1992) (National School Lunch Program, School
Breakfast Program, Special Milk Program benefit eligibility determinations); 7 C.F.R.
§ 246.9 (1992) (Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and Children
benefit eligibility determinations); 7 C.F.R. § 273.15 (1992) (Food Stamp Program eligibility
determinations); 7 C.F.R. § 400.93 (1992) (federal crop insurance eligibility determinations);
7 C.F.R. § 1900.55 (1992) (farm loan and grant eligibility determinations); 7 C.F.R. § 614.7
(1992) (Conservation Reserve Program eligibility determinations); 20 C.F.R. § 10.131 (1992)
(Federal Employee's Compensation Act disability and death benefit eligibility
determinations); 20 C.F.R. § 404.907 (1992) (federal old-age, survivors and disability
insurance benefit eligibility determinations); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1400 (1992) (social security
benefit eligibility determinations for the aged, blind, and disabled); 42 C.F.R. § 405.716
(1992) (Medicare benefit eligibility determinations).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31 (identifying and explaining the powers of
administrative agencies).
64. United States Dep't of Agric., Agricultural Statistics, United States Gov't Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. (1990). North Dakota farmers received more than $7.14 million in
federal crop subsidy payments in 1988. Id. at 436. In dollar amount alone, North Dakota
ranked seventh among the fifty states in 1988. Id. In light of North Dakota's relatively low
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receive these payments could come under increased scrutiny by
members of Congress, possibly leading to an exertion of congres-
sional influence on eligibility proceedings.
The significance of the DCP Farms decision may be dimin-
ished in the wake of a bill which Senator Conrad and eight other
representatives have introduced in the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives. 5 The proposed bill is the USDA National Appeals
Division Act of 1992.66 If enacted, 7 the proposed legislation will
create an independent administrative appeals division within the
USDA.6" As a result, the ASCS, for example, could no longer act as
a prosecutor and judge in federal farm program disputes. 9
Presumably, the administrative determinations of federal
crop subsidy eligibility would be less threatened by pressure from
external sources, provided the bill is enacted. If the bill is enacted,
the import of DCP Farms may never affect farmers' operations;
however, farmers still could encounter the adverse implications of
DCP Farms throughout their lives when they apply for other fed-
eral benefits.7 °
Douglas J Murray
population, this ranking proves just how important federal subsidies are to North Dakota
farmers.
65. Alan Malasky, USDA National Appeals Division Act of 1992 Is Introduced,
WASHINGTON AGLAW REPORT, Sept. 1992, at 1.
66. Id. The bill also would repeal two sections: 7 U.S.C. §§ 1385 & 1429 (1988). Id. at
2. The ASCS has consistently utilized these two sections to shield ASCS decisions from
review by the federal courts. Id. at 4. Sections 1385 and 1429 generally state that
agricultural administration agency determinations shall be firm and conclusive. Id. These
sections, in effect, deny protection to farmers from arbitrary and capricious ASCS
determinations because the judicial review provisions under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1988), do not apply if a specific statute precludes review. Id. at 3.
67. Although the bill died at the end of the 1992 legislative session, a substantially
similar proposal will be introduced this summer. Telephone interview with Lora Rose,
Office Manager/Caseworker for Senator Kent Conrad's office, Grand Forks, North Dakota
(June 11, 1993). Conrad is the leading sponsor of the proposal and expects the future bill to
pass early, given the fact that Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy was a co-sponsor of the
USDA National Appeals Division Act of 1992.
68. Id. at 1. Currently, the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS),
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), Rural
Development Administration (RDA), and Soil Conservation Service (SCS) offer no appeal
system which is independent of their respective agencies. Id.
69. Id. at 3.
70. See supra note 62 (listing federal benefit programs).
